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THE ROTH TEST AND ITS COROLLARIES
INTRODUCTION
The apparently unconditional wording of the First Amendment of
the Constitution securing freedom of expression1 has been held to be
subject to certain exceptions.2 Whether this guarantee is so absolute as
to bar censorship or that portion of expression designated as "ob-
scenity", had been controversial until decided in the negative in the
now legendary case of Roth v. United States.' Since that time, state and
federal courts have applied the test therein defined in an attempt to
delineate the limitations which can constitutionally be placed upon
expression in all forms.
During the past term of the Supreme Court, three cases were decided
in an attempt to clarify the doubtful aspects of the Roth test 4 concern-
ing the nature of "obscenity". Ginzburg v. United States is significant
as the court's initial treatment of the advertising provision of the fed-
eral statute making certain obscene materials nonmailable5 while adding
a new "pandering" test to the Roth criteria. Mishkin v. New York and
Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure v. Massachusetts, respectively, de-
velop the "average person" and "redeeming social value" elements of
the Roth approach.
Through these cases the law relating to "obscenity" has undergone
sufficient expansion and renovation to warrant a review of the censor-
ship decisions along with an examination of the new holdings. As the
primary issue in each of these decisions was the proper application of
the Roth criterion, no attempt will here be made to cover the history
1. "Congress shaft make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech or of the
press:' U.S. Const., amend. 1.
1 2. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250 (1952).
a. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
4. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S.
502 (1966); Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 states in pertinent part:
Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article, matter, thing,
device, or substance; and Every written or printed card, letter, circular,
book, pamphlet, advertisement 'or notice of any kind- giving information, where,
or how, or from whom, by what means of such mentioned matter . . .may be
obtained . .. * * * Is declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not be con-
veyed in the mails or delivered from any post office or by any letter carrier.
Whoever knowingly uses the mails for the mailing, carriage in the mails, or
delivery of anything declared by this section to be nonmailable ... shall be fined
not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years or both for the
firt such offense.
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of obscenity before Roth except as it may bear upon the recent
decisions.
Roth AND THE NATURE OF OBSCENITY
In 1957, the Supreme Court squarely faced the "then unresolved
problem of the constitutionality of official censorship of obscenity." 6
The Court, in Butler v. Michigan,7 declared unconstitutional a Michigan
statute making it a misdemeanor to sell or make available any book
containing obscene language "tending to the corruption of the morals
of youth." 8 Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority, stated that
the statute was "not reasonably restricted to the evil with which it is
said to deal" and that "the incidence of this enactment is to reduce the
adult population of Michigan to reading only what is fit for children." 9
The Butler case, was followed by the Roth-Alberts decision, wherein
Justice Brennan spoke for the majority of the Court in affirming the
convictions in both cases for violation of a federal and state offense. 10
Roth involved a conviction based upon the federal statute" making
punishable the mailing of obscene material while Alberts was prose-
cuted under a California statute" making it a misdemeanor to keep or
advertise obscene material for sale. Although measuring the rights of
the respective defendants by the First and Fourteenth Amendments,'3
the test established was uniformly applied to both state and federal cases
without distinction.
Holding that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally
protected speech or press, Justice Brennan qualified censorable obscen-
ity to be those ideas which are "utterly without redeeming social im-
portance." "4 Stating the standard for determining what is obscene 'as,
6. Roth v. United States, supra note 3, at 481; Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of
Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. Rav. 5 (1960)
(Hereinafter cited as Lockhart & McClure).
7. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
8. Id. at 382.
9. Ibid.
10. Roth v. United States, Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
11. Supra note 5.
12. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 311 (1955).
13. "In Roth, the primary constitutional question is whether the federal obscenity
statute violates the provision of the First Amendment . . . . In Alberts the primary
constitutional question is whether the obscenity provision of the California Penal Code
invade the freedom of speech and press as they may be incorporated in the liberty
protected from state action by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
354 U.S. at 479-480.
14. Id. at 484-5.
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"whether to the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme of the material, taken as a whole, appeals
to prurient interest" 15 the Court rejected the English test announced
in Regina v. Hicklin.0 The majority described the English approach
as unconstitutionally restrictive of the freedom of speech and press as
it potentially included material legitimately dealing with sex.'7
Consideration of appeal to the prurient interest of the "average per-
son" in conjunction with the requirement of "redeeming social im-
portance" permitted greater conformity with these constitutional man-
dates.
The leading cases have attempted to set out a standard of an hypo-
thetical man applicable to obscenity as the "reasonable man" is to torts
or the "man learned in the act" is to questions of invention in patent
law.'8 Prior to the Roth decision, the Butler case struck down Michi-
gan's statute thereby indirectly rejecting the Hicklin test,'0 but the
Court later passed up the opportunity to develop a positive criterion of
sexual maturity to which the "prurient interest" effect might be ap-
plied, in Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day.20 The defendants in that case
were convicted of attempting to send magazines, consisting largely of
photographs of nude males bearing the names of the model and the
photographer, through the mails in violation of the federal obscenity
statute. Contending, in line with Roth that the standards of "prurient
interest" appeal of the magazines should be judged in terms of their
probable impact on the "average person," although not a likely re-
cipient of the publications. The Court of Appeals held, "that the ad-
ministrative findings respecting their impact on the 'average homo-
15. Id. at 489. The Court in footnote 20 of the opinion, cited at page 487, referred
to the A.L.I. MODEL PENAL CODE, Sec. 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957) wherein it is
stated, ". . . A thing is obscene if, considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to
prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, and if it
goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation
of such matter... "
16. L.R. 3 Q. B. 360, 369 (1868). "... And I think the test of obscenity is this, whether
the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprive and corrupt those whose
minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this
sort may fall."
17. See Roth, supra note 10, at 489.
18. United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F.Supp. 182, 184 (S.D. N.Y. 1933).
Woolsey's opinion made reference to this man as a "person with average sex instincts-
what the French would call rhomme moyen sensuel."
19. Butler, supra note 7, at 383; Lockhart & McClure, at 70.
20. 370 US. 478 (1962).
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sexual' sufficed to establish the Government's case." 21 In overruling
the conviction, the Supreme Court found that the magazines were not
so offensive "as to affront current community standards of decency."
The Court found it unnecessary to consider the question of the proper
audience by which the "prurient interest" appeal of the magazines
should be judged.2 2
Mishkin: CoMPOsI iON OF THE AVERAGE PERSON
The issue was again presented to the Supreme Court in Mishkin v.
New York,23 one of the three cases being considered. In this instance,
the Court dealt directly with the problem and reached a realistic
result. Mishkin was convicted under the New York criminal obscenity
statute2 for hiring others to prepare obscene books and keeping them
for sale. He contended, on appeal, that some of the books involved,
depicting various deviant sexual practices, did not satisfy the prurient
interest criterion laid out in Roth because they would not appeal to the
prurient interest of the "average person" but to such a person they
would be disgusting and sickening rather than erotic .25 The Court re-
jected this contention holding that:
Where the material is designed for and primarily disseminated to a
clearly defined deviant sexual group rather than the public at large,
the prurient appeal requirement of the Roth test is satisfied if the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the
prurient interest in sex of the members of that group .... We adjust
the prurient appeal requirement to social realities by permitting the
appeal of this type of material to be assessed in terms of the sexual
interests of its intended and probably recipient group.26
Out of context the above-quoted statement appears to be a step back-
ward to the Regina v. Hicklin "particularly susceptible person" test.
In an attempt to avoid this consequence, the Court made it clear that
21. Id. at 482.
22. Ibid.
23. Mishkin, supra note 4.
24. N. Y.PENAL CODE § 1141.
25. Mishkin, supra note 4, at 508.
26. Ibid.
27. See supra note 16, Regina v. Hicklin also recognized the concept of a type of
exception to the Roth test still held to be voted that, "A medical treatise with illustra-
tions necessary for the information of those whose education or information the work
is intended may, in certain sense, be obscene, and yet not subject for indictment, but
it can never be that these prints may be exhibited for anyone, boys and girls, to see
so they pass." Hicklin, supra note 16, at 369. See text accompanying note 30 infra.
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the recipient group was to be defined with more specificity than in
terms of the sexually immature person.28
Most of the decisions dealing with the proper recipient audience,
for determining censorable obscenity, have been concerned with a
sexually deviant group as in Mishkin. Unlike Mishkin, they were
largely negative holdings striking down adopted standards or lower
court instructions as being too restrictive.2" Cases approximating the
interpretation of Mishkin on the "average person" criterion have been
concerned with permitting admitted obscenity to be distributed law-
fully "where in good faith it is to be used exclusively within a pro-
fessional group pursuing legitimate professional purposes." 30 Thus, the
present opinion attempts to employ a standard which customarily
permits an exception to proscribable obscenity and apply that standard
to proscribe, to a specifically defined group, otherwise protected
material.
In finally dealing with the issue, the Court has taken the initial step
in a realistic approach to obscenity. In so doing, it appears to have
recognized what two writers have called a "variable obscenity." 8
This is not only in the sense of geographical or time variance, but in
the sense of a "chameleonic quality of materials that changes with time,
place, and circumstances." 82 This possibility was recognized by Chief
justice Warren in Roth38 and by the drafters of the Model Penal Code
in excepting from the offense of dissemination of obscene material,
"dissemination to institutions or individuals having scientific or other
special justification for such material." 34
Unfortunately, the Court did not fully utilize the opportunity pre-
sented to it, for the result of the case is too indefinite. What was meant
by defining the recipient group "with more specificity" is not explained.
28. Mishkin, supra note 4, at 509.
29. United States v. Kennerly, 209 F.Supp. 119 (S.D. N.Y. 1913). Although the
Hicklin test was upheld it was severely criticized. See United States v. One Book
Called "Ulysses," supra note 18; Roth, supra note 10; Butler, supra note 7. See also
Lockhart & McClure, at 73.
30. People v. Maher, 18 Cal. 923, at 926 (1962); United States v. 31 Photographs, 156
F.Supp. 350 (S.D. N.Y. 1957); United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses," 72 F.2d
705 (2d Cir. 1934); United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930); Hicklin, supra
note 27. Virginia has a statutory exception for such material. See VA. CODE ANN.
§18.1-263.3(10) (1960).
31. Lockhart & McClure at 70.
32. Id. at 68.
33. Roth, supra note 10 at 495 (concurring opinion).
34. MODEL PENAL CODE, op cit. supra note 15, at § 207.10(4) (c).
1966]
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.All other things being equal, would the fact that the recipient group is
narrowed to one class of persons such as "homosexuals," "youths under
18," "doctors"; etc., remove the taint of the Hicklin test and adequately
protect art from the warning of Judge Learned Hand that:
To put thought in leash to the average conscience of the time is per-
haps tolerable, but to fetter it by the necessities of the lowest and
least capable seems a fatal policy.3 5
Under the Mishkin holding once the recipient group has been defined
and prurient appeal of the material to that group has been established,
the material can then be proscribed as being criminally obscene. Does
it then become obscene for purposes of distribution to everyone or
just to members of the group defined? If the former is the case, the
dangers of Hicklin's "particularly susceptible person" test return, and if
the latter situation is true, a deaf ear is turned to Justice Douglas'
warning that censorship "substitutes majority rule where minority
tastes or viewpoints were to be tolerated." 36
Nevertheless, Justice Brennan is correct to recognize the "social re-
alities" in determining the appeal to the intended and probable re-
cipient group. When the realities are that the material is intended
only for those to whom it has an abnormal appeal can they complain
that for purposes of proscription the appeal to govern is their own
and not that of the average person?
Memoirs AND REDEEMING SOCIAL VALUE
A second criterion enunciated in the Roth case was the utter absence
of redeeming social value. Consideration of this prerequisite in the
categorization of materials as obscene proved to be the key factor in
the Court's decision that John Cleland's famous novel Memoirs of a
Woman of Pleasure was entitled to the protection of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. Limiting review, in Memoirs of a Woman of
Pleasure v. Massachusetts,37 solely to whether the book could be labeled
obscene in view of the standards established in Roth v. United States,
the work was found to contain a modicum of social value. This posi-
tion, that a publication although possessing the requisite prurient ap-
peal and even being patently offensive may not be designated obscene
35. Kennerly, supra note 29 at 121.
36. Memoirs, supra note 4 at 427.
37. 383 US. 413, 419 (1966).
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if of social value,38 is entirely compatible with Mr. Justice Brennan's
views in Rotb, wherein he stated that:
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance-
unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the pre-
vailing climate of opinion-have the full protection of the [constitu-
tional] guarantees, unless excludable because they encroach upon the
limited area of more important interests. But implicit in the history
of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly with-
out redeeming social importances.39
The "redeeming social value" criterion was referred to in Jacobelli
v. Ohio4 0 as having been part of the orignal Rotb test, and by way of
dictum in that decision Justice Brennan added, "Nor may the constitu-
tional status of the material be made to turn on 'weighing' of its social
importance against its prurient appeal for a work cannot be proscribed
unless it is 'utterly' without social importance." 41 This placed a cri-
terion, thought by some42 not to be included in the original test, on
a par with the two commonly recognized criteria. The wording of
Justice Brennan's opinion in Memoirs now elevates that criterion to the
point where it is the determinative factor. As a result of this decision,
regardless of the offensiveness of the material and regardless of its
prurient appeal, if it can be shown that the material contains some
modicum of redeeming social value it will not be judged obscene. In
this connection it is possible that the Memoirs decision may prevent
consideration of Misbkin's "recipient group." Thus, if the Court had
applied the Memoirs rationale to the books Mishkin was keeping for
sale and found that by the standards of society as a whole they had
some redeeming social value, the fact that these books actually ap-
pealed to the prurient interest of the average homosexual would be of
no circumstances.
The viewpoint of the Court seems to be contradictory in these two
cases. If the Court is going to look at the intended recipient group
on one hand but then turn to society in general on the other hand, it
38. Ibid.
39. Roth, supra note 10 at 484.
40. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
41. Id. at 191.
42. Lockharf & McClure, at 70. We conclude that the Court in the Roth-Alberts
opinion laid down two constitutional requirements for determining what is obscene ...
that material must be judged as a whole, not by its parts, and that it must be judged
by its' impact on the average person, not the weak and susceptible. See also Memoirs,
supra note 4 at 445 (Clark, J, dissenting); Id. at 462 (White, J., dissenting).
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looks as though the obscenity criteria are becoming malleable and may
be shaped to reach the result most appealing to the Court in each case.
Justices Harlan and Stewart have adhered to a test for obscenity
which allows proscription of only that matter which can be classified
as "hardcore pornography." " In his opinion in Memoirs Justice Har-
lan noted, "Given my view of the applicable constitutional standards,
I find no occasion to consider the place of 'redeeming social impor-
tance' in the majority opinion in Roth, an issue which further divides
the present Court." 44 Justice Black feels that the First Amendment
prohibition that, "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the free-
dom of speech," is an absolute,45 and Justice Douglas has said that,
"Freedom of expression can be suppressed if, and to the extent that, it
is so clearly brigaded with illegal action as to be an inseparable part of
it." 46 Justices Clark and White also opposing the redeeming social
value test,47 there remain only three Justices who have adhered to the
Brennan concept to its present stage.
Considering the wide split within the Court on this point, it may
be that in the future the place of redeeming social importance may be
minimized and that the trend of the Court will be to focus on "hard-
core pornography" as advocated by Justices Harlan and Stewart.48
But, should redeeming social importance remain fixed within the frame-
work of the censorship criteria, the Court will be greatly increasing
its task of determining what is censorable and the bookselling mer-
chants will become hopelessly confused as to what can safely be put
on the shelves and be sold.
Ginzburg AND THE EFFECT OF PURVEYING
Having attempted to clarify the elements of the Roth criteria in
Mishkin and Memoirs, the Court further developed the test in Ginzburg
v. United States,49 by examining the marketing techniques employed
in advertising the publication. Ralph Ginzburg was charged with vio-
43. Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 457 (1966)
(Harlan, J., dissenting); Jacobellis, supra note 40, at 197 (Stewart J., concurring).
44. Memoirs, supra note 43 at 456, Court's note 1. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
45. Smith v. California, 36 U.S. 147, 157 (1959) (Black, J., concurring).
46. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1954) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
47. Memoirs, supra note 43 at 445 (Clark, J., dissenting); Id. at 463 (White, J.,
dissenting).
48. See Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional
Standards, 45 MINN,. L. Rav. 5, at 58 (1960).
49. 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
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lating the federal obscenity statute.5 0 The matter mailed consisted of
three publications and circulars describing the method by which the
publications might be obtained. Each of the three publications was
considered separately and adjudged obscene in the district court.5 1 A
stipulation was entered in that proceeding by the prosecution agreeing
that the circulars were not obscene per se,52 and the only reference in
the decision to the method chosen by the defendants in mailing their
publications and circulars appeared in the court's special findings. Con-
sideration of the method was attributed to its evidentiary value in
demonstrating the defendants' general scheme and purpose; 3 however,
it was not deemed determinative of the obscenity of the publications.
On appeal to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the opinion noted
the circulars were not obscene in and of themselves, 54 but nevertheless
affirmed the convictions.5 5 Characterizing each publication as directed
to prurient interest and offensive to current national community stand-
ards, affirmance of the convictions on the advertising counts followed
as a matter of course.56
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 7 and in affirming the con-
victions,48 the Court stated that since there was no claim of misinter-
pretation of the Roth test, the sole issue was whether there was a mis-
application of the criteria.5 Noting that the evidence of technique and
setting in which the publications were presented were properly con-
sidered in determining the question of obscenity, the opinion indicated
that materials not obscene per se might be made such in this manner,6°
when viewed "against a background of commercial exploitation of
erotica solely for the sake of their prurient appeal." 61
Referring to Chief Justice Warren's concurring opinion in Roth,
62
50. See statute cited supra note 5.
51. 224 F.Supp. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
52. Id. at 132.
53. Id. at 131.
54. 338 F.2d 12, 13 (3rd Cir. 1964).
55. Ibid.
56. Id. at 16.
57. 380 U.S. 961 (1963).
58. Ginzburg.v. United States, supra note 49 at 465.
59. "Since petitioners do not argue that the trial judge misconceived or failed to
apply the standard we first enunciated in Roth v. United States [citation omitted], the
only serious question is whether those standards were correctly applied." Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. Id. at 466.
62. Roth, supra note 46 at 495.
1966]
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Justice Brennan introduced the concept of pandering, "the business of
purveying textual or graphic matter openly advertised to appeal to the
erotic interest of their customers," as the motive for the origin of these
publications.s An examination by the Court of the content of the
advertising circulars showed that the defendants were taking advantage
of recent Court decisions which, according to the circulars, "have given
to this country a new breath of freedom of expression," and in doing so
the publications were said to handle "Love and Sex with complete
candor." 64 To consider this type of statement, "pandering" under the
above definition would be to ignore the fact that"... sex and obscenity
are not synonymous." 15
The Court relied heavily on the very well-reasoned case of United
States v. Rebhuhn66 where publications assumed useful to scholars and
learned professions were pandered to the general public. In that case,
Judge Learned Hand stated that the publications:
had a place, though a limited one, in anthropology and in psycho-
therapy. They might also have been lawfully sold to laymen who
wished seriously to study the sexual practices of savage barbarous
people of sexual aberrations; in other words most of them were not
obscene per se.67
However, from the tenor of Judge Hand's words, the statement that
they were not obscene per se could have meant no more than when sold
for the purposes enumerated, these materials could not be held to
be obscene and would have escaped proscription-they were not ob-
scene under all conditions.
Justice Brennan turned the argument around to say that although
matter is not otherwise censorable it becomes so if the manner of dis-
tribution tends to cheapen it and exploit its potential prurient appeal.
Under this interpretation, material of substantial aesthetic value will
be censored if "purveyed" by men such as Ginzburg with no more
titillation than that it deals with, "Love and Sex with complete candor."
Under the federal statute and consistent with the history of the
statute enunciated in Manual Enterprises, Inc., v. Day that "its focus was
seen to be solely in the character of the material in question," 68 a con-
63. Ginzburg v. United States, supra note 49 at 467.
64." Id. at 468, Court's note 9.
65. Roth v. United States, supra note 46 at 487,
66. 109 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1940).
67. Id. at 515.
68. 370 US. 478 at 483 (1962); Ginzburg, supra note 49 at 493 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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viction can only be had if the materials being mailed are obscene or if
these mailed materials give information about where obscene materials
may be obtained- 9 This Court assumed the obscenity of the publications
was dependent upon the evidence of pandering and all three courts
accepted the Government stipulation that the advertising circulars were
not obscene. Thus, Ginzburg presents the anomalous situation of non-
obscene circulars telling where, for purposes of the statute, obscene
materials can be obtained and a conviction results for mailing nonob-
scene materials.
justice Harlan's dissent, in keeping with his belief that only hardcore
pornography can, in any case, be censored, asserted that the effect of
the Court's opinion is to rewrite the federal obscenity statute, "with-
out the sharply focused definitions and standards necessary in such a
sensitive area." 70 He speculated that under the present decision, the
decisions of the United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses given by
Judges Woolsey and A. N. Hand7' "might be rendered nugatory if
a mailer of Ulysses is found to be titillating senders with its 'course
[sic], blasphemous, and obscene' portions, rather than piloting them
through Joyce's stream of consciousness." 72
CONCLUSION
The three cases when considered together pose the problems of over-
lapping and competing criteria. The Memoirs decision said that re-
deeming social value could not be weighed against prurient appeal, but
went on to state that:
On the premise, . . . that Memoirs has the requisite prurient appeal
and is patently offensive, but has only a minimum of social value,
the circumstances of production, sale and publicity are relevant in
determining whether or not the publication and distribution of the
book is constitutionally protected. Evidence that the book was com-
mercially exploited for the sake of other values, might justify the
conclusion that the book was utterly without redeeming social im-
portance.73
69. The advertising provisions will not be violated if the mailed material merely
"gives the promise of some obscene pictures.' United States v. Hornick, 229 F.2d 120,
121 (3rd Cir. 1956). See also Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S. 604 (1895).
70. Ginzburg, supra note 49 at 494. Justice Black agreed, Id. at 477.
71. 5 F.Supp. 182 (D.C. N.Y. 1933); 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
72. Ginzburg, supra note 49 at 497.
73. Memoirs, supra note 43 at 420.
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The Roth test has become too clouded with collateral issues which
destroy the possibility of establishing a uniform standard of obscenity.
Recipient groups become important under the Mishkin decision for
the determination of prurient appeal but not for the establishment of
social value except as "pandering" to a particular group may serve to
destroy the possible social value. Under the Ginzburg holding it now
becomes possible to hold that materials previously ascertained as being
of literary value, and not proscribable, may, if pandered, be charac-
terized as obscene.
Further attempts to pinpoint the Roth standard will, in all likelihood,
confuse it with more exceptions. Facing "social realities" 71 is causing
the Court to reconsider the restrictive position prior to Roth as a pos-
sible means of effective censorship. Along with a reconsideration of
the obscenity tests should also be a reevaluation of the aims of censor-
ship. Under the present status of the law, it is unclear whether the
evils of obscenity are that it criminally arouses the minds of men, or that
it is without any redeeming value to society such as to warrant its
distribution.
Bradford Coupe
74. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
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